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1. INTRODUCTION
To better explain market anomalies, puzzles and various market phenomena, eco-
nomics and ﬁnance are witnessing an important paradigm shift, from a representative,
rational agent approach towards a behavioral, agent-based approach in which econ-
omy and markets are populated with bounded rational agents who have heterogeneous
beliefs (Conlisk (1996)). With common beliefs and perfect information, investors hold
identical portfolios and trade mainly to balance portfolios, which contradicts the ex-
tremely large trading volume across stock markets. Recent literature (see, for exam-
ple, Hong and Stein (2007), Berraday (2009)) have indicated that heterogeneity among
agents plays an important role in explaining high volatility in asset price and high trad-
ing volume. In the literature, heterogeneity is used to characterize either asymmetric
information or differences in opinion on the same information. In the ﬁrst case, agents
are in general Bayesians who hold the same prior probability but with asymmetric pri-
vate information (Williams (1977), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Diamond and Ver-
recchia (1981), Kyle (1985), Grundy and McNichols (1989), Wang (1994), Detemple
and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998), Angeletos and Werning (2006), Allen, Morris
and Shin (2006), Weitzmann (2007), and Bakshia and Skoulakisb (2008)). In this
framework, the trading volume driven by the portfolio rebalancing and unanticipated
liquidity shocks seems to be far too small to account for the large trades observed in
the ﬁnancial markets. This suggests the second case as a more promising one in which
the heterogeneity in beliefs is not due to asymmetric information but rather to intrinsic
differences in how to view the world, that is people agree to disagree. The following
discussion focuses on the second view about the heterogeneity.
Literature has made a signiﬁcant contribution to the understanding of the market
aggregation and the impact of heterogeneous beliefs amongst agents on market equi-
librium (see, for example, Lintner (1969), Rubinstein (1976), Abel (1989, 2002), and
more recently Calvet, Grandmont and Lemaire (2004), Wenzelburger (2004), B¨ ohm
and Chiarella (2005), B¨ ohm and Wenzelburger (2005), Jouni and Napp (2006, 2007),
Sharpe (2007), Gollier (2007), Chiarella, Deici and He (2010, 2010) and Horst and
Wenzelburger (2008)). When agents have different opinions, the heterogeneity in be-
liefs among agents is often characterized by notions of different risk tolerance, op-
timism/pessimism, and conﬁdence/doubt. Cao and Ou-Yang (2009) made clear that
disagreement about the mean of future asset payoffs capture the investors’ conditional
optimism and pessimism about the asset value while disagreement about the preci-
sion of future asset payoffs capture the heterogeneity of the investors’ conﬁdence
level in the payoffs. Along this line, some theoretical models have been developed
to explain equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles (Abel (2002), Jouni and NappDIFFERENCES IN OPINION AND RISK PREMIUM 3
(2006, 2007), and Gollier (2007)). More recently, we also see some empirical stud-
ies on optimism/pessimism and conﬁdence/doubt (Hvide (2002), Giordani and Soder-
lind (2006)), the heterogeneity as a pricing factor (Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens
(2005)), and the stochastic discount factor to explain the equity premium and risk-free
rate puzzles (Weitzmann (2007) and Bakshia and Skoulakisb (2008)). However, the
theoretical implications are either inconsistent with empirical ﬁndings or not able to
provide signiﬁcant explanation on the empirical observations.
There are mainly two driving forces for the development of the literature in hetero-
geneousbeliefs, oneistoexplainequitypremiumandrisk-freeratepuzzles(Mehraand
Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989)), to which several theoretic explanations have been
proposed recently, and the other is on the survival of irrational investors and their price
impact (Friedman (1953), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1991), San-
droni (2000), Blume and Easley (2006), Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerﬁeld (2006),
Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009)). For example, Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001)
adopt a non-standard utility function, motivated by prospect theory; Benartzi and
Thaler (1995) consider myopic loss aversion. The notion of overconﬁdence has been
exploredinﬁnanceliterature(DeLong, Shleifer, SummersandWaldmann(1990), Kyle
and Wang (1997), and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)). Several empir-
ical studies of professionals’ economic forecasts and psychological surveys indicate
that agents have optimism and overconﬁdence
1 about their own (relative) abilities (Ra-
bin (1998), Hirshleifer (2001), and Giordani and Soderlind (2006)). Deviating from
rational expectation in the standard neoclassical paradigm, when beliefs are exoge-
nously given, it has been found (Detemple and Murthy (1994), Abel (2002), Calvet
et al. (2004), Jouini and Napp (2006), and Gollier (2007)) that a pessimistic bias and
doubt in the subjective distribution of the growth rate of consumption and a positive
correlation between risk tolerance and pessimism (doubt) leads to an increase of the
market price of risk. To discipline the heterogeneity in beliefs and to understand how
agents form their beliefs differently, in a static Nash equilibrium (Kyle (1989)) set up
of two agents model when agents hold incorrect but strategic beliefs, Jouini and Napp
(2009) provide a discipline for belief formation through a model of subjective beliefs
1As elaborated in Hvide (2002), experimental psychologic literature have applied, somewhat confus-
ingly, two distinct meanings of the term ‘overconﬁdence’, overconﬁdence1 and overconﬁdence2 (called
in Hvide (2002)). In the stock market, overconﬁdence1 relates to a skewed ﬁrst moment of a subjective
probability distribution, while overconﬁdence2 relates to a skewed second moment of a subjective prob-
ability distribution. In general, there is no clear relation between overconﬁdence1 and overconﬁdence2
since they reﬂect different underlying phenomena. In Abel (2002), a uniform pessimism is deﬁned as
(the subjective distribution being) a leftward translation of the objective distribution, doubt as a mean-
preserving spread of the objective distribution. To avoid confusion, in our discussion, we adopt the no-
tions of Abel (2002) and refer overconﬁdence1 and overconﬁdence2 to optimism and (over)conﬁdence,
respectively. The conﬁdence in DeLong et al. (1990) and Kyle and Wang (1997) is actually referred to
overconﬁdence2.4 HE AND SHI
in order to provide a rationale for belief heterogeneity. They ﬁnd that optimism (con-
ﬁdence) as well as pessimism (doubt) emerge as optimal beliefs of agents’ strategic
behavior and there is a positive correlation between pessimism (doubt) and risk toler-
ance. This strategic explanation of heterogeneous beliefs is in contrast with rational
approach to beliefs where agents try to reﬂect the ‘world as it is’ in their beliefs, and
with approach in which forward-looking agents optimally distort beliefs and beliefs
are of intrinsic value to agents, as with wishful thinking or fear of disappointment (see
Brunnermeier and Parker (2005)).
Following the literature on the survival of irrational investors and their impact on the
market, Friedman (1953) argued that irrational investors will consistently lose money
and be driven out of the market by rational investors and therefore they have no price
impact. Basedonapartialequilibriummodel, DeLongetal.(1991)suggestthattraders
with wrong beliefs may hold portfolios with higher growth rates and therefore can
eventually outgrow the rational traders and survive in the long-run. In contrast, San-
droni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) use a general equilibrium approach with in-
termediate consumption and show that irrational traders do not survive in the long run.
When investors only care about their terminal consumption and irrational investors
have constant belief about the drift of the endowment process, Kogan et al. (2006)
demonstrate that survival and price impact are two independent concepts. They show
that survival is not a necessary condition for the irrational trader to inﬂuence long-
run prices. Dumas et al. (2009) propose a general equilibrium difference-of-opinion
sentiment model with overconﬁdent agents overreacting to public signals but intertem-
porally optimizing, causing excessive volatility. It is often found in this literature that,
irrational agents may not survive, but they become extinct after long time (in hundreds
of years). Therefore, they can have impact on the market before becoming extinction.
Recently, some empirical tests on optimism/pessimism and conﬁdence/doubt have
been conducted. By introducing a concept of pragmatic beliefs, Hvide (2002) uses a
simple game-theoretic example of a job market and shows optimism can be the equi-
librium outcome if agents form beliefs pragmatically. The main justiﬁcation for pro-
grammatic beliefs is dynamics in the sense that, without awareness about their own
optimism, agents are gradually learning that a certain way of forming beliefs is more
rewardingthan other ways. Also, by quantifying the amount of pessimism and doubt in
survey data on US consumption and income, Giordani and Soderlind (2006) ﬁnd some
evidence of pessimism, but individual forecasters clearly exhibit overconﬁdence rather
than doubt. By showing that the average distribution shows no statistically signiﬁcant
sign of either overconﬁdence or doubt, they conclude that doubt is not a promising
explanation of the equity premium puzzle and the amount of pessimism provides only
a rather small improvement in the empirical performance of the model. To examine
whether heterogeneous beliefs are a priced factor in traditional asset pricing models,DIFFERENCES IN OPINION AND RISK PREMIUM 5
Anderson et al. (2005) develop a new empirical measures based on the disagreement
among analysts about expected earnings. They ﬁnd that the inclusion of this factor
does improve the ﬁt of the factor models, especially for small ﬁrms. However, on
average, dispersion only captures 9 to 26 basis points of excess return and therefore
a factor for dispersion cannot fully compensate for the explanatory power of funda-
mental factors. To assess the impact of “structural uncertainty” about the volatility of
consumption growth, Weitzmann (2007) and Bakshia and Skoulakisb (2008) propose
a Bayesian learning model, resulting a well-speciﬁed stochastic discount factor and
tractable solutions for equity premium and risk-free rate. However, to explaining the
puzzles, the model requires implausible prior beliefs well outside typical calibration
ranges for historical volatility of consumption growth and risk aversion.
It can be seen from the above discussion that most of the theoretical models that
relate heterogeneous beliefs to equity premium and the risk-free rate assume that in-
vestorsknowthepayoffoftheriskyassetsineachstateoftheworld, butdisagreeonthe
probability of each state occurring. This is of course a convenient way to formulate the
problem because it limits the dimension of heterogeneity, however, in reality investors
may need to make prediction about the entire joint probability distribution of asset re-
turns, this complicates the problem immensely. To simplify the analysis, we consider
in this paper a static ﬁnancial market with two risky assets, one risk-free asset, and two
agents with different risk preferences have heterogeneous beliefs about the joint proba-
bility distribution of asset returns. We also extend the analysis to allow a continuum of
investors. We assume that both agents agree on the expected return and risk (measured
by the standard deviation) for one risky asset but disagree on that of the other risky
asset, they may also disagree on the correlation coefﬁcient of the returns of the two as-
sets. It is a common belief that when investors are “on average” unbiased, in aggregate
the biases may ‘cancel out’ and hence have no effect on equilibrium prices. We will
examine to what extent this statement is true. We impose heterogeneous beliefs as bi-
ased beliefs characterized by mean-preserving spreads of a benchmark homogeneous
belief such that investors are on average unbiased. By assuming that agents maximize
a primitive utility function (Sharpe (1991) and Levy and Markowitz (1979)), agents
choose their optimal portfolios based on their subjective beliefs and risk tolerance. By
constructing a consensus belief, the market equilibrium is characterized by the con-
sensus belief. Different from the standard rational expectation equilibrium, the market
equilibrium under the consensus belief reﬂects the bounded rationality of the agents
in the sense that the market equilibrium is achieved when agents make their optimal
decision based on their subjective beliefs. We call such equilibrium as a boundedly
rational equilibrium, when the impact of investors’ biased beliefs do “cancel out”, the
consensus belief conforms to the average belief which is assumed to be unbiased. We
show that the “cancel out” effect holds when the different aspects of the heterogeneity,6 HE AND SHI
including the risk tolerance, optimism/pessemism and conﬁdence/doubt, are uncorre-
lated. However, they do not cancel out when different aspects of heterogeneity are
correlated and have signiﬁcant effect on the endogenous variables such as the mar-
ket risk premium (equity premium), risk-free rate, market volatility and the portfolio
weights of the market portfolio. This paper aims to improve our understanding of the
impact of differences in opinion on the market equilibrium, in particular, the market
risk premium and the risk-free rate (rather than trying to address the equity premium
and risk-free rate puzzles in the standard setup of maximization of intertemporal utility
of consumption). It will become clear in our analysis that the impact of heterogene-
ity on market equilibrium with two risky assets is signiﬁcantly different to the case
with one risky asset. For example, when the more risk tolerant investor is less opti-
mistic about the future return for one of the risky asset, the market indeed becomes
pessimistic about the asset’s future return, consistent with the ﬁndings in Jouni and
Napp (2006, 2007). However, we show that this does not necessarily imply a higher
market risk premium and lower risk-free rate as one would expected in the case with
only one risky asset. The additional dimension of heterogeneity induced by having
two correlated risky assets plays an important role on the market risk premium and the
risk-free rate when combining with biases in expected asset returns.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set up the economy and describe
the aggregation problem when agents have heterogeneous preferences and beliefs. We
show how the different risk tolerance and heterogeneous beliefs can be aggregated
through a consensus belief in market equilibrium. In particular, we derive a CAPM
under heterogeneous beliefs. In Section 3, as a benchmark of our analysis, we include
the traditional CAPM under the homogeneous belief. In Section 4, by introducing
different risk preference and biased beliefs among two agents, we examine the joint
impact of heterogeneity on the equity premium and risk-free rate in market equilib-
rium both analytically and numerically. In particular, we explore the conditions on the
biased beliefs to achieve high equity premium and low risk-free rate. The analysis with
two agents is then extended to a continuum of agents. The paper concludes in Section
5.
2. HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS AND BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we ﬁrst set up the stylized economy with heterogeneous beliefs and
then characterize the market equilibrium.
2.1. The Economy. We consider a two-date economy in which there are two risky
assets, indexed by j = 1;2 and a riskless asset, furthermore there are two agents
2,
indexed by i = 1;2. Assume agents have different preferences and the end-of-period
2The discussion and results of this section for the general economy of many risky assets and many
heterogeneous beliefs can be found in He and Shi (2009).DIFFERENCES IN OPINION AND RISK PREMIUM 7
return of asset j(j = 1;2) is denoted by ~ rj, return of the riskless asset is denoted
by rf. The probability distribution of the returns of the two risky assets are assumed
to be jointly normal. Agents have heterogeneous beliefs in the expected returns and














be his/her beliefs in the means and covariance matrix, respectively, where
¹i;j = 1 + Ei(~ rj); ¾
2
i;j = V ari(~ rj); ½i = Correli(~ r1; ~ r2)
for i;j = 1;2. We use Bi := (¹i;1;¹i;2;¾i;1;¾i;2;½i) to denote the beliefs of agent i.
2.2. Optimal Portfolio Problem. The terminal wealth
3 of agent i is given by
~ Wi = Wi0(1 + ~ ri;p);
where ~ ri;p = ((1 + rf)(1 ¡ 1T¼i) + ¼T
i (1 + ~ r)) is the random return of agent i’s
portfolio, ¼i = (¼i;1;¼i;2)T is the vector of portfolio weights (proportion of wealth
invested in each risky asset) and 1 = (1;1)T. We assume that investors maximize a
primitive utility function
Ui(~ ri;p) = Ei(~ ri;p) ¡
1
2¿i









where the risk-tolerance ¿i measures the marginal rate of substitution of variance for
expected return. This utility function has been used in Sharpe (1991), it is consistent
with Markowitz portfolio selection criterion and also serves as a good approximation
for other type of utility functions (Levy and Markowitz (1979)). Solving this standard





i (¹i ¡ Rf1); (2.1)
where Rf = 1 + rf measures the marginal certainty equivalent rate of return (CER)
per one percent investment in each asset. The CER is the same across both investors.
2.3. Consensus Belief and Boundedly Rational Equilibrium. We characterize mar-
ket equilibrium by the concept of a consensus belief developed in Chiarella, Dieci and
He (2010). Essentially, the consensus belief reﬂects the aggregation of the hetero-
geneous beliefs when the market is in equilibrium. It helps us to understand how
heterogeneity or biases in agents’ beliefs can affect the endogenous variables derived
from market equilibrium such as the market risk premium, risk-free rate and market
volatility.
3Within the two-period model, the terminal wealth and consumption of agents are the same.8 HE AND SHI
Deﬁnition 2.1. A belief Ba = (¹a;1;¹a;2;¾a;1;¾a;2;½a) is called a market consensus
belief of the two agent economy if the equilibrium price vector of the risky assets
and the risk-free rate under the heterogeneous beliefs Bi := (¹i;1;¹i;2;¾i;1;¾i;2;½i)
(i = 1;2) is also the market equilibrium price vector of the risky assets and the risk-
free rate under the homogeneous belief Ba.
In the following, we show that such consensus belief for the economy with hetero-
geneous beliefs can be constructed. Let Wi0 be the initial wealth of agent i(i = 1;2).
Then W0 = W10 + W20 corresponds to the total market wealth. Deﬁne the market
wealth proportion wi =
Wi0






2; that is; ¼
¤
1 w1 + ¼
¤
2 w2 = ¼m;
where ¼m denotes the market portfolio of risky assets. We also assume that the risk-
less asset is in net zero supply, this implies that the aggregate market must invest all
its wealth in the risky assets, that is, 1T¼m = 1. Since the market equilibrium is ob-
tained based on the fact that both agents make their optimal portfolio decision under
their subjective beliefs, rather than the objective belief, we call such equilibrium as
Boundedly Rational Equilibrium (BRE), characterized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.2. Let
¿a := w1 ¿1 + w2 ¿2;

























the equilibrium market portfolio is given by
¼m = ¿aV
¡1
a (Ea(~ r) ¡ rf1); (2.4)
the equilibrium CAPM relation is given by
Ea[~ r] ¡ rf1 = ¯[Ea(~ rm) ¡ rf]; (2.5)
and the equilibrium risk-free rate is
rf =
1TV ¡1





Proposition 2.2 can be proved similarly to the proof of Proposition 1 in Chiarella,
Dieci and He (2010). Based on Proposition 2.2, there is a consensus belief which is a
weighted average of the heterogeneous beliefs. Different from the homogeneous beliefDIFFERENCES IN OPINION AND RISK PREMIUM 9
of the representative agent in the standard rational paradigm, the consensus belief con-
tainsusefulinformationoftheheterogeneousbeliefsofindividualagents. Inparticular,
we have the following observations. (i) The risk tolerance of the market is a weighted
average of that of the two agents weighted by the market wealth share of the agent.
Note that the wealth weighted risk tolerance wi¿i(i = 1;2) also appears in the consen-
sus beliefs deﬁned in (2.2) and (2.3). Therefore, we can treat wi¿i (i = 1;2) as a risk
tolerance, implying that wealthier investors are more risk tolerant. (ii) If we interpret
the inverse of the variance/covariance matrix as the precision matrix, then consensus
belief of the precision matrix is a risk-tolerance weighted average of investors’ sub-
jective beliefs of the precision matrices. (iii) The consensus belief of expected asset
returns is also an average of agents’ subjective beliefs weighted by their risk-tolerances
and precision matrices.
The impact of the heterogeneity on the market equilibrium, CAPM relation, market
risk premium, and risk free rate can be complicated in general. By focusing on the
case of two assets and two agents in the following discussion, we are able to examine
explicitly the impact of heterogeneity on the market equilibrium. To compare with the
traditional CAPM, we ﬁrst consider the homogeneous belief as the benchmark case in
the next section.
3. A BENCHMARK CASE UNDER HOMOGENEOUS BELIEF
To examine the impact of the heterogeneity on the market equilibrium and compare
with the market equilibrium under a homogeneous belief, we consider in this section
a benchmark case under the standard rational expectation in which both agents may
have different risk tolerance, but they have the same beliefs in returns
4, denoted by
Bo = (¹1;¹2;¾1;¾2;½), that is Bi = Bo for i = 1;2. For this benchmark case, we have





















¿a(¹1 ¡ ¹2) + ¾2(¾2 ¡ ½¾1)
¿a(¹2 ¡ ¹1) + ¾1(¾1 ¡ ½¾2
!
; (3.1)
4The benchmark beliefs Bo can be treated as either an objective belief or a benchmark homogeneous
belief.10 HE AND SHI
the market risk-premium, risk-free return and market variance are given, respectively,
by
^ E(~ rm ¡ rf) :=
(¹1 ¡ ¹2)2¿2










































It is easy to see that ¿a = ^ ¾2(~ rm)=^ E(~ rm ¡ rf), so the market risk-tolerance represents
the marginal rate of substitution between market risk premium and market variance.
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) show that the market risk premium and the risk-free rate
are quite complex expressions of the benchmark belief Bo. Next we use an numeri-
cal example to illustrate the limitation of the benchmark case in generating high risk
premium and low risk-free rate.
Example 3.1. Let the two risky assets in the economy have expected returns (¹1;¹2) =
(1:06;1:09), standard deviations (¾1;¾2) = (0:08;0:3), and correlation coefﬁcient
½ = 0:8. Both agents hold the benchmark belief, that is, Bi = Bo = (¹1;¹2;¾1;¾2;½).
For simplicity, we also assume that both agents have equal shares of the initial market
wealth (so that w1 = w2 = 1=2)5.
By choosing a reasonable level of risk-tolerance, say ¿i = 0:5(i = 1;2) (and hence
¿a = 0:5), we have from ¿a = ^ ¾2(~ rm)=^ E(~ rm ¡ rf) that the market in equilibrium re-
quires 2% expected excess return (above the risk-free rate) for 10% standard deviation.
Consequently, we have from equations (3.1) and (3.2) that the market portfolio is given
by ¼m = (0:962; 0:038)T and
^ rf = 4:62%; ^ E(~ rm ¡ rf) = 1:49%; and ^ ¾m = 8:63%:
Note that the risk-free rate is rather high, the risk-premium and market volatility are
rather low. Intuitively, because asset 2 has a much larger volatility relative to asset 1,
but there is not enough compensation in terms of expected return, every investor knows
about this (homogeneous beliefs), therefore the market portfolio consists little of asset
2, resulting in low market volatility and market risk premium. If both agents become
more risk averse so that the risk tolerance ¿i reduces, say to ¿a = 0:1, then
^ rf = 0%; ^ E(~ rm ¡ rf) = 6%; and ^ ¾m = 8%:
5Alternatively, we can treat wi¿i as the risk tolerance of agent i and argue that wealthier agents are more
risk tolerant. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, we always assume that w1 = w2 = 1=2.DIFFERENCES IN OPINION AND RISK PREMIUM 11
The market portfolio becomes ¼m = (1; 0)T (asset 2 is redundant). In this case,
reducing the risk tolerance can certainly increase the market risk premium and re-
duce the risk-free rate, however, it does not increase the proportion of total wealth
invested in asset 2 or the market volatility. In order to achieve those, we introduce bi-
ases into investors’ beliefs in the following discussion. If the biases “cancel out”, then
the consensus belief Ba would conform to the homogeneous benchmark belief Bo, and
heterogeneity would not matter in determining the endogenous variables when market
is in equilibrium. However, we will show that this is generally not the case and hetero-
geneity in beliefs can have signiﬁcant impact on the market equilibrium. In particular,
we show that certain correlations among biased beliefs can generate high market risk
premium and low risk-free rate without having to decrease the risk tolerance level.
4. THE IMPACT OF HETEROGENEITY
To examine the impact of the heterogeneity on the market equilibrium explicitly, we
assume that both agents agree about the expected return and the variance of the ﬁrst
risky asset, asset 1 (which might be well informed) but disagree about the expected
return, standard deviation of the second asset, asset 2 (which may be less informed)
and the correlation coefﬁcient of the returns of the two risky assets. To see whether bi-
ases in investors’ beliefs indeed “cancel out” and have no effect on market equilibrium,
disagreements are characterized by mean-preserving spread about the benchmark be-
lief. We assume the beliefs in the expected return and the standard deviation of the
ﬁrst asset for both agents are given by the benchmark beliefs: (¾i;1;¹i;1) = (¾1;¹1)
for i = 1;2, while the risk tolerance and the beliefs of the two agents in the expected
return and standard deviation of the second asset, and the return correlation of the
two assets are mean-preserving spreads of the benchmark belief Bo and risk tolerance
¿o. More precisely, we assume that the risk-tolerances of the two agents are given,
respectively, by
¿1 = ¿o(1 ¡ ¢); ¿2 = ¿o(1 + ¢); ¢ 2 (¡1;1); (4.1)
the beliefs about the standard deviation of asset 2 are given by
¾1;2 = ¾2(1 ¡ ±); ¾2;2 = ¾2(1 + ±); ± 2 (¡1;1); (4.2)
the beliefs about the correlation between asset returns are given by
½1 = ½(1 ¡ "); ½2 = ½(1 + "); " 2 (¡1;1); (4.3)
and the beliefs of expected returns of asset 2 are given by
¹1;2 = ¹2(1 ¡ ®); ¹2;2 = ¹2(1 + ®); ® 2 (¡1;1): (4.4)12 HE AND SHI
The mean-preserving spreads imply that, on average, risk-tolerance and belief in this
heterogeneous economy is exactly the same as the benchmark homogeneous econ-
omy. However, the consensus belief is not necessarily the same as the benchmark
belief. As a result, the market portfolio, market risk-premium, risk-free rate and the
market volatility may also differ from the homogeneous benchmark economy. For this
setup, the different aspects of the heterogeneity are characterized by ¢, ±, " and ®. To
examine the joint impact of risk tolerance, optimism/pessimism, and conﬁdence/doubt
on the market, we consider four different combinations of these parameters in the fol-
lowing.
4.1. Case1: ImpactofRiskToleranceandOptimism/Pessimism. Weﬁrstconsider
the case where the two agents have different risk-tolerance and heterogeneous belief
regarding the expected future return of asset 2, that is
± = 0; " = 0; ¢ 2 (¡1;1); ® 2 (¡1;1): (4.5)
This means that agent 1 is less (more) risk tolerant than agent 2 when ¢ > (<)0 and
agent 1 is more pessimistic (optimistic) than agent 2 when ® > (<)0. In particular,
when ¢® > 0(< 0), the risk tolerance and optimism of the two agents are positively
(negatively) correlated, meaning that the more risk-tolerant agent is optimistic, while
the less risk-tolerant agent is pessimistic about future return of asset 2. Applying
Proposition 2.2 to this case, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.1. Under (4.5), the consensus belief is given by
¿a = ¿o; Va = Vo; ¹a = (¹1; ¹2(1 + ®¢))
T: (4.6)
Consequently, comparing to the benchmark case,
(i) the change in market portfolio is given by
¼m ¡ ^ ¼m =
®¢ ¿o¹2
¾2
1 ¡ 2½¾1¾2 + ¾2
2
1; (4.7)
(ii) the change in risk-premium is given by
(E(~ rm) ¡ rf) ¡ (^ E(~ rm) ¡ ^ rf) = ®¢¹2
¾1(½¾2 ¡ ¾1) + ¿o(¹2 ¡ ¹1)
¾2
1 ¡ 2½¾1¾2 + ¾2
2
; (4.8)
(iii) the change in risk-free rate is given by
^ rf ¡ rf = ®¢¾1¹2
½¾2 ¡ ¾1
¾2
1 ¡ 2½¾1¾2 + ¾2
2
; (4.9)
(iv) the change in market volatility is given by
¾
2





(¹2 ¡ ¹1) + (¹2(1 + ®¢) ¡ ¹1)
¾2
1 ¡ 2½¾1¾2 + ¾2
2
; (4.10)DIFFERENCES IN OPINION AND RISK PREMIUM 13















where (^ ¯1; ^ ¯2)T = Vo^ ¼m=^ ¾2
m are the asset betas under the homogeneous
benchmark case.
Proof. Substitute (4.5) into (4.1)-(4.4) yields risk tolerance and beliefs for both agents,
then the consensus belief in (4.6) can be computed by applying Proposition 2.2, equa-
tion (2.2) and (2.3). The market portfolio ¼m can be computed by equation (2.4) and
the risk-free rate rf by (2.6). Asset betas ¯, market volatility ¾2
m and the market pre-
mium E(~ rm ¡ rf) can be easily calculated subsequently once the market portfolio has
been computed.
¤
Corollary 4.1 characterizes explicitly the impact of the heterogeneity on the market.
It is easy to see that if both agents have either the same risk preference (so that ¢ = 0)
or the same benchmark belief in the expected return of both assets (so that ® = 0),
then ®¢ = 0 and the results for the heterogeneous beliefs are reduced to that for
the benchmark homogeneous case. Consequently, the heterogeneity among the two
agents are cancelled out. Otherwise, the impact of the heterogeneity in this case (4.5)
depends on the sign of ®¢ and the return correlation ½ in the benchmark belief, to
which Corollary 4.1 leads to following three implications.
Firstly, when risk-tolerance and optimism about future returns are positively (nega-
tively)correlated
6, thatis®¢ > (<)0, itfollowsfrom(4.6)thattheaggregatemarketis
optimistic (pessimistic) about the expected return of the second asset. Consequently,
the aggregate market, indicated by the market portfolio in (4.7), invests more (less)
into asset 2 and less (more) into asset 1 and that the market volatility measured by ¾m
is high (low) following (4.10). This observation that the market becomes pessimistic
when the risk tolerance and pessimism are positively correlated is also found in Jouini
and Napp (2006).
Secondly, comparing with the benchmark belief case, we have from (4.8) that the
market with biased beliefs among the two agents increase the market risk premium
when either
®¢ > 0 and ¹2 ¡ ¹1 > ¾1(¾1 ¡ ½¾2)=¿o (4.12)
or
®¢ < 0 and ¹2 ¡ ¹1 < ¾1(¾1 ¡ ½¾2)=¿o: (4.13)
6In the sense that more risk-tolerant agent is optimistic while less risk-tolerant agent is pessimistic.14 HE AND SHI
Similarly, from (4.9), the risk-free rate under the biased belief is reduced when either
®¢ > 0 and ½ > ¾1=¾2; (4.14)
or
®¢ < 0 and ½ < ¾1=¾2: (4.15)
This observation implies that the biased beliefs can increase the market premium and
reduce the risk-free rate either (i) when the risk tolerance and optimism of agent are
positively correlated, the returns of the two assets are highly positively correlated (so
that ½ > ¾1=¾2), and the disagreement in asset expected returns is large (¹2 ¡ ¹1 >
¾1(¾1¡½¾2)=¿o); or (ii) when the risk tolerance and pessimism of agent are positively
correlated, the returns of the two assets are less (even negatively) correlated (so that
½ < ¾1=¾2), and the disagreement in asset expected returns is small (¹2¡¹1 < ¾1(¾1¡
½¾2)=¿o). Within the framework of heterogeneous beliefs, Abel (2002) and Jouini and
Napp (2006) argue that a positive correlation between the risk tolerance and pessimism
is sufﬁcient to generate high equity premium and low risk-free rate. However, our
analysis shows that correlation between risk tolerance and optimism/pessism may not
be sufﬁcient, depending on the disagreement dispersion and return correlation. In
particular, we will show in Section 4.3 that, in certain situation, the biased belief in
return correlation can generate signiﬁcant high market equity premium and low risk-
free rate.
Thirdly, observation of equation (4.11) implies that the standard CAPM relation un-
der the benchmark belief is no longer held, though the CAPM under the heterogeneous
beliefs still holds under the consensus belief. It is clear that, when the disagreement in
the expected return disappears, the betas become the standard betas under the bench-
mark belief. Under the biased beliefs, the betas ¯j in equation (4.11) can be decom-
posed into the betas ^ ¯j under the benchmark belief and a term related to the biases in
the beliefs, which becomes a risk factor under the heterogeneous CAPM relation. As
part of the ¯j, the risk factor related to the biased beliefs becomes part of the system-
atic risk which is missing in the standard CAPM relation under rational expectation. In
general, thesystematicriskfactorduetothebiasedbeliefscanbeeitherpositiveorneg-
ative. Foe instance, if asset 2 is riskier than asset 1 (in the sense of ¹2 > ¹1;¾2 > ¾1)
and the return correlation is high (so that ½ > ¾1=¾2), then a positive (negative) cor-
relation between the risk tolerance and optimism increases (decreases) the systematic
risk of the two risky assets (¯i > (<)^ ¯i) and the market risk premium, but decreases
(increases) the risk-free rate. This indicates that, when the biases among agents are
correlated, they become part of the systematic risk of risky assets.
To assess the exact impact, we now conduct a numerical analysis. Based on the nu-
merical values provided in Example 3.1, we show graphically in Figure 4.1 the impact
































































(a3) Risk premium (a4) Risk-free rate
FIGURE 4.1. Effect of heterogeneity in risk-tolerance ¢ and beliefs
of expected return ® on the market proportion of asset 2 (a1), market
volatility (a2), market risk-premium (a3) and the risk-free rate (a4).
second risky asset in the market portfolio) in Figure 4.1(a), the market volatility in Fig-
ure 4.1(b), the expected market return in Figure 4.1(c), and the risk-free rate in market
equilibrium in Figure 4.1(d). For the numerical values, we have ½ > ¾1=¾2. The plots
are symmetric reﬂecting the fact the effect of heterogeneity depends on the product
®¢ rather than individually. We see that, when the product ®¢ increases, the market
portfolio consists more of asset 2, which leads to higher market return and volatility;
at the same time the risk-free rate reduces and the risk-premium increases. In addition,
the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio increases, suggesting that heterogeneity of ®¢
improves the mean-variance efﬁciency of the aggregate market.
To quantify the impact on the market, base on the numerical values provided in
Example 3.1, we choose (¢;±;";®) = (0:2;0;0;0:1). The results are reported in16 HE AND SHI
Cases (¢;±;";®) ¼m;2 ¾(~ rm) E(~ rm ¡ rf) rf
E(~ rm)¡rf
¾m
Benchmark (0;0;0;0) 0:038 8:63% 1:49% 4:62% 0:1727
Case 1 (0:2;0;0;0:1) 0:2258 12:3% 2:54% 4:14% 0:2061
Case 2 (0;¡0:2;0;0:1) 0:7511 24:15% 3:88% 4:37% 0:1606
Case 3 (0;0;0:2;0:1) 0:5415 19:31% 5:69% 1:94% 0:2947
Case 4 (¡0:2;0:2;0;0) 0:1124 10:00% 1:77% 4:57% 0:1770
TABLE 4.1. Effects of heterogeneity on the market proportion of asset
2 (¼m;2), market volatility (¾(~ rm)), market risk-premium (E(~ rm ¡rf)),
the risk-free rate (rf), and the Sharpe ratio (E(~ rm¡rf)=¾m for the four
cases, compared with the benchmark homogeneous case. Numerical
values for the benchmark belief and risk tolerance are given in Example
3.1.
Table 4.1. Comparing with the benchmark homogeneous belief, the results for Case
1 in Table 4.1 show that heterogeneity in the risk tolerance and the expected return
helps to increase the market risk premium and reduce the risk-free rate when ®¢ > 0.
However, the overall effect is not signiﬁcant for the chosen parameters. Risk premium
increases moderately by 1% and the risk-free rate is merely reduced by less than half of
a percent. This is mainly due to that the market becomes over-optimistic with respect
to asset 2’s future return which offsets the increase in aggregate volatility.
4.2. Case 2: The Impact of Optimism/Pessimism and Conﬁdence/Doubt. In the
second case, we focus on the impact of the optimism/pessimism (measured by ®) and
conﬁdence/dobut (measured by ±) for asset 2 on the market in equilibrium by letting
¢ = 0; " = 0. Measured by the beliefs in the standard deviation, agent 1 becomes
conﬁdent (doubt) when ± > 0. Applying Proposition 2.2, we obtain the following
result.
Corollary 4.2. For the second case when ¢ = 0; " = 0 and ±; ® 2 (¡1;1), the
consensus belief Ba = (¹a;1;¹a;2;¾a;1;¾a;2;½a) is given by ¿a = ¿o,
¹a;1 = ¹1 ¡ ®±¹2
½¾1
¾2(1 + ±2 ¡ ½2)























(1 ¡ ±2)2(1 ¡ ½2)









Proof. Substitute ¢ = 0 and ² = 0 into (4.1)-(4.4) yields risk tolerance and beliefs for
both agents, then the consensus belief Ba can be computed by applying Proposition
2.2, equations (2.2) and (2.3). ¤DIFFERENCES IN OPINION AND RISK PREMIUM 17
Corollary 4.2 gives the explicit impact of the biased beliefs in the expected return
and the standard deviation for the second asset among the two agents. One special
case is particular interesting. This is when there is no biased beliefs in the standard
deviation of the second asset (that is ± = 0). In this case, we see from (4.16) and
(4.17) that there is no difference between the heterogeneous case with biased beliefs in
expected return on the second asset and the benchmark case; so effect from the biased
beliefs in the expected return of the asset 2 is canceled out and has no impact on the
market. In general, based on (4.16) and (4.17), we see that the biased beliefs in the
expected returns of asset 2 has impact on the market expected return, but not the stan-
dard deviations and correlation. However, the biased beliefs on the standard deviation
of the return of asset 2 affects the expected returns, standard deviation, and correlation
of both assets when the asset returns are correlated. This effect vanishes when ½ = 0.
Corollary 4.2 reﬂects a joint impact of the optimism/pessimism and conﬁdence/dobut
on the market. From equations (4.17), one can see that the aggregate market becomes
over-conﬁdent when agents have biased beliefs regarding the variance of asset 2’s re-
turn so that, for 0 < ± < 1, we have ¾a;1 < ¾1; ¾a;2 < ¾2 and ½a¾a;1¾a;2 < ½¾1¾2.
From (4.16), when ®± < 0, that is when the optimistic (pessimistic) agent is conﬁdent
(doubtful) about the future return of asset 2, the market perceives a higher expected
return for both assets.
To examine the impact on the market, we let ± = ¡0:2 and ® = 0:1. This means
that the second (ﬁrst) agent is optimistic (pessimistic) and conﬁdent (doubt) on the
future return of the second asset, so that ®± < 0. The numerical results in Table 4.1
show a dramatic increase in the market’s holding of asset 2. Therefore the market
gains in risk premium but also becomes much more volatile. This is due to the fact
that the increase in expected return is much higher for asset 2 than for asset 1 and the
value of (½¾1=¾2) is small relative to (2 ¡ ½2), see (4.16). The risk-free rate reduces
only slightly. Intuitively, although the market consists much more of the riskier asset,
but the market also becomes over-conﬁdent and over-optimistic which drives up the
risk-free rate. This observation is consistent with the survey result in Giordani and
Soderlind (2006) that doubt is not promising explanation of the high equity premium
and the amount of pessimism provides only a rather small improvement. The Sharpe
ratio drops comparing to the benchmark case, suggesting that the gain in risk premium
cannot compensate for the higher volatility.
4.3. Case 3: The Impact of Optimism/Pessimism and Biased Belief in the Corre-
lation. In the third case, we examine the joint impact of heterogeneity in the expected
return of asset 2 and the correlation coefﬁcient by letting ¢ = 0;± = 0 and consid-
ering the effect of (";®). When ² > (<)0, agent 1 believes that the return correlation18 HE AND SHI
is lower (higher) while agent 2 believes that the return correlation is higher (lower).
Applying Proposition 2.2 to this case, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.3. For the case that ¢ = 0;± = 0 and ";® 2 (¡1;1), the consensus
belief Ba = (¹a;1;¹a;2;¾a;1;¾a;2;½a) is given by ¿a = ¿o,
¹a;1 = ¹1 ¡ ®"
½¾1


































Proof. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 4.2. ¤
Corollary 4.3 shows the impact of the optimism/pessimism and the biased beliefs
in the correlation on the market. The biased beliefs in the expected return of asset 2
affect the market expected returns of both assets, but not the variances and covariances.
However, the biased beliefs in the return correlation affect both the ﬁrst and second
moments of the market returns of both assets as well as the return correlation. It is
easy to see that, for 0 < " < 1, we have ¾a;1 < ¾1;¾a;2 < ¾2 and ½a¾a;1¾a;2 > ½¾1¾2.
This indicates that in aggregate the market becomes more conﬁdent about the future
returns of the both assets but perceives a higher return covariance comparing to the
benchmark case. For ®" > 0, that is when the optimistic agent also believes in a
higher correlation between asset returns, we see from equation (4.18) that the market
perceives a higher (lower) expected return for asset 2 (asset 1) when ½ > 0 and vice
versa when ½ < 0. Intuitively, when ½ > 0 and ®² > 0, the market invests more
into asset 2 because of the higher perceived expected return. As a result, the aggregate
market expected return and volatility increase. However, different from the previous
cases, because (4.19) indicates that ½a > ½, hence there is less diversiﬁcation effect
and consequently one should expect a signiﬁcant reduction in the risk-free rate.
To examine the impact of the heterogeneity in the expected return and correlation,
we choose ² = 0:2 and ® = 0:1 so that ®" > 0. The results are given for Case 3
in Table 4.1, showing the most desirable result with a high market risk premium and
low risk-free rate. The risk-free rate in this case is reduced signiﬁcantly by nearly 3%
while the risk premium increased signiﬁcantly by more than 4%. Most noticeably, the
Sharpe ratio in this case becomes 0:2497, the highest amongst all cases including the
homogeneous benchmark by far, implying that the aggregate market becomes the most
mean-variance efﬁcient when ®" > 0.
4.4. Case 4: The Impact of Risk-tolerance and Conﬁdence/Doubt. In the fouth
case, we examine the joint impact of heterogeneity in the risk-tolerance (measure byDIFFERENCES IN OPINION AND RISK PREMIUM 19
¢) and conﬁdent/doubt (measure by ± by letting ® = 0 and " = 0. Applying Proposi-
tion 2.2 to this case, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.4. For the case that ® = 0;" = 0 and ¢;± 2 (¡1;1), the consensus
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Proof. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 4.2. ¤
Corollary4.4showsthatthejoinedimpactoftherisk-toleranceandconﬁdence/doubt
on the market is rather complicated. When there is no biased belief in the standard de-
viation (so that ± = 0), the consensus belief is reduced to the benchmark belief. Jouni
and Napp (2006) argue that a positive correlation between risk tolerance and doubt
can contribute to high equity premium and low risk-free rate. In our example, if we
choose ¢ = ¡0:2 and ± = 0:2 so that ±¢ < 0, that is the more risk-tolerant agent is
more conﬁdent about the future return for asset 2, we report the numerical results in
Tab 4.1 for Case 4. We can see that the market risk premium increases and risk-free
rate reduces though the magnitudes of the changes are not very signiﬁcant. On the one
hand, this result is inconsistent with the result suggested by Jouni and Napp (2006),
suggesting that results from the single risky asset case do not necessarily carry over to
the case with two risky assets, typically impact of heterogeneity depend on the correla-
tion structure of the asset returns. On the other hand, consisting with the survey result
in Giordani and Soderlind (2006), this illustrates that doubt may not be a promising
explanation of the equity premium puzzle.
4.5. Biased Beliefs in the “Safe” Stock. In the previous cases, agents are assumed to
have disagreement over the distribution of the terminal return of the “risky” stock, in
thesensethatthestockhasahigherexpectedreturnandhigherrisk. Wenowshowthat,
when agents have heterogeneous beliefs in the “safe” stock which has lower expected
return and lower risk, the impact on the market can be different. The is illustrated by
considering the following numerical example
7.
Example 4.5. Let the two risky assets in the economy have expected returns (¹1;¹2) =
(1:09;1:06) and standard deviations (¾1;¾2) = (0:3;0:08) and correlation coefﬁcient
½ = 0:8. Agents have heterogeneous beliefs about terminal return of asset 2, and
7Basically, we swap the two risky assets and still consider the biased beliefs in the second asset.20 HE AND SHI
different risk tolerance. Their heterogeneity is characterized by parameters ¢, ±, "
and ® as described earlier in this section.
Cases (¢;±;";®) ¼m;2 ¾(~ rm) E(~ rm ¡ rf) rf
E(~ rm)¡rf
¾m
Benchmark (0;0;0;0) 0:038 8:63% 1:49% 4:62% 0:1727
Case 1 (¡0:2;0;0;0:1) 0:2207 12:2% 4:63% 2:04% 0:3794
Case 2 (0;0:2;0;0:1) 0:3854 12:99% 6:11% 1:04% 0:4710
Case 3 (0;0;¡0:2;0:1) 0:2525 10:11% 1:87% 4:9% 0:1846
Case 4 (0:2;0:2;0;0) 0:0637 9:09% 1:48% 4:71% 0:1633
TABLE 4.2. Effects of heterogeneity on the market proportion of asset
2 (¼m;2), market volatility (¾(~ rm)), market risk-premium (E(~ rm ¡rf)),
the risk-free rate (rf) and the Sharpe ratio (E(~ rm)¡rf)=¾m for the four
cases, compared with the benchmark homogeneous case.
We redo the numerical analysis in Table 4.1 for the four cases and present the results
in Table 4.3. The interesting cases are (i) Case 1 when (¢;±;";®) = (¡0:2;0;0;0:1)
and (ii) Case 2 when (¢;±;";®) = (0;0:2;0;0:1). In both cases, there is a signiﬁcant
increase in the market risk premium and reduction in the risk-free rate. Now we pro-
vide some explanations for these results. For (i), we have ®¢ < 0, suggesting that
there is a positive correlation between the risk-tolerant and pessimism. This leads the
aggregate market to perceiving a lower expected return for asset 2 (see (4.6)), there-
fore investing more into asset 1 (risky stock), driving up the aggregate market expected
return and volatility. However, in contrast with Case 1 in Table 4.1, the risk-free also
reduces signiﬁcantly because the market is pessimistic rather than optimistic about ex-
pected equity returns overall and more willing to invest in the risk-free security. In (ii),
it follows from (4.16) and ®± > 0 (the more optimistic agent is less conﬁdent) that the
aggregate market becomes pessimistic about future return for both asset. As a result,
the market is even more willing to invest in the risk-free security than in the case (i),
thus the reduction in risk-free rate is greater in this case. Therefore, the combined
effect of heterogeneity in the beliefs of the expected and variance of terminal return
leads to the most desirable result of a low risk-free rate and high market risk premium.
This case also produces the highest Sharpe ratio amongst all the cases considered.
4.6. Extension to a continuum of investors. As the number of investors increase in
the above model, increasing dimensionality can make the model infeasible. In order to
have a parsimonious model to incorporate the realism of large number of investors, we
extend the previous model of two agents to a model with a continuum of investors. In
this case, we are able to characterize investors’ heterogeneity in risk tolerance, initial
wealth share and beliefs by probability distributions and obtain similar results to that
of the two agent economy.DIFFERENCES IN OPINION AND RISK PREMIUM 21
Consider a continuum of investors indexed by e 2 [0;1], we assume that the initial
wealth shares of investors are equal, thats is we = 1 for all e
8. The economy is deﬁned
byameasurablefunction(¿F;¾1;F;¾2;F;½F;¹1;F;¹2;F) : [0;1] ! R+£R+£R+£R 2
[0;1]£R£R , where (¿e;¾e;1;¾e;2;½e;¹e;1;¹e;2) is the risk tolerance, belief of standard
deviations, return correlation and the belief of expected returns for investor e. The
consensus belief Ba in this economy is the limits of equation (2.2) and (2.3) as the



































We assume that investors’ risk tolerance ¿e and beliefs of future asset returns Be =
(Ve;¹e) are i.i.d random variables for each investor e. This allows us to characterize
the consensus belief by simply taking expectations across all investors. In the same
spirit of Admati (1985) (together with necessary technical requirements, such as the
uniform boundedness of the second moments of the random variables, to ensure that
the law of large number applies, see p.636 in Admati (1985) for details.), we deﬁne
the integral of a random vector
R 1
0
~ Xe dwe ´ 0 if for every sequence feig of distinct
indices from [0;1], (1=I)
PI
i ~ Xei ! 0 as I ! 1. By this deﬁnition
9, we can write
the consensus belief Ba as Va = ¿aE[~ ¿ ~ V ¡1]¡1; ¹a = ¿¡1
a VaE[~ ¿ ~ V ¡1~ ¹]. Note that the
expectation operator is not taken over all possible outcomes of future asset return, but
all possible beliefs among the investors. We will see that in some cases, it is possible
to write down explicitly the consensus belief in terms of the ﬁrst two moments of the
random variables, in other, we may require Monte-Carlo simulations.
In the sprit of the case for two agents, we make the following assumptions about
the distributions of the heterogeneous beliefs of the continuum agent e 2 [0;1]. There
are two risky assets and a risk-free asset in the economy. We assume that agents agree
on the expected and standard deviation of future returns for the ﬁrst risky asset with
¹e;1 = ¹1 and ¾e;1 = ¾1, but disagree on that for the second risky asset. For agent e
and the second risky asset, let the expected return, the standard deviation, the return
correlation, and the risk tolerance are given by, respectively,
¹e;2 = ¹2(1 + ~ ®e); ¾e;2 = ¾2(1 + ~ ±e); ½e = ½(1 + ~ ²e); ¿e = ¿o(1 + ~ ¢e);
(4.21)
8Another way is to treat the product we¿e as investor e’s risk tolerance as in the two agent economy
9Suppose that ~ Xe = ~ Ye ¡ E[~ Ye], since
R 1
0
~ Xe de = 0, it is natural to deﬁne
R 1
0







e de. This means that
R 1
0
~ Ye de =
R 1
0 E[~ Ye] de which equals E[~ Y] if ~ Ye are i.i.d.22 HE AND SHI
where, ~ ±e
i:i:d » N(0;¾2(~ ±)), ~ ®e
i:i:d » N(0;¾2(~ ®)), ~ ²e
i:i:d » N(0;¾2(~ ²)), and ~ ¢e
i:i:d »
N(0;¾2(~ ¢)), all truncated between ¡1 and 1. We also denote correlations between
random variables ~ ¢e, ~ ±e, ~ ²e and ~ ®e by ½(~ ¢; ~ ®), ½(~ ±; ~ ®), ½(~ ²; ~ ®) and ½(~ ¢; ~ ±), the corre-
lations are independent of e.
In the case where investors’ beliefs in the variance/covariances matrix is homoge-
neous, that is,
¾
2(~ ±) = 0 and ¾
2(~ ²) = 0: (4.22)
We can extend Corollary 4.1 as follows.
Corollary 4.6. Under (4.22), the consensus belief is given by
¿a = ¿o; Va = Vo; ¹a = (¹1; ¹2(1 + Cov(~ ®; ~ ¢))
T: (4.23)
where Cov(~ ®; ~ ¢) = ½(~ ®; ~ ¢)¾(~ ¢)¾(~ ®). Consequently, comparing with the benchmark
case,
(i) the change in market portfolio is given by
¼m ¡ ^ ¼m =
Cov(~ ®; ~ ¢) ¿o¹2
¾2
1 ¡ 2½¾1¾2 + ¾2
2
1; (4.24)
(ii) the change in risk-premium is given by
(E(~ rm) ¡ rf) ¡ (^ E(~ rm) ¡ ^ rf) = Cov(~ ®; ~ ¢)¹2
¾1(½¾2 ¡ ¾1) + ¿o(¹2 ¡ ¹1)
¾2
1 ¡ 2½¾1¾2 + ¾2
2
; (4.25)
(iii) the change in risk-free rate is given by
^ rf ¡ rf = Cov(~ ®; ~ ¢)¾1¹2
½¾2 ¡ ¾1
¾2
1 ¡ 2½¾1¾2 + ¾2
2
; (4.26)
(iv) the change in market volatility is given by
¾
2
m ¡ ^ ¾
2
m = Cov(~ ®; ~ ¢)¿
2
o¹2
(¹2 ¡ ¹1) + (¹2(1 + Cov(~ ®; ~ ¢)) ¡ ¹1)
¾2
1 ¡ 2½¾1¾2 + ¾2
2
; (4.27)
(v) the changes in the beta coefﬁcients are given by
¯1 = ^ ¯1 + Cov(~ ®; ~ ¢)¹2¿o
½¾2 ¡ ¾1
¾2
1 ¡ 2½¾1¾2 + ¾2
2
;
¯2 = ^ ¯2 + Cov(~ ®; ~ ¢)¹2¿o
¾2 ¡ ½¾1
¾2
1 ¡ 2½¾1¾2 + ¾2
2
: (4.28)
where (^ ¯1; ^ ¯2)T = Vo^ ¼m=^ ¾2
m are the asset betas under the homogeneous
benchmark case.
Proof. From(4.21)and(4.22), theconsensusbeliefofexpectedassetreturnsaccording
to equation (4.20) is given by ¹a = (¹1; ¹a;2)T where ¹a;2 = ¿¡1
a (E(~ ¿)E(~ ¹2) +
Cov(~ ¿; ~ ¹2)) where ¿a = E(~ ¿) = ¿o. Since Cov(~ ¿; ~ ¹2) = Cov(¿o(1 + ~ ¢);¹2(1 + ~ ®)),DIFFERENCES IN OPINION AND RISK PREMIUM 23
we obtain ¹a;2 = ¹2(1 + Cov(~ ®; ~ ¢). The rest of the proof is analogous to that of
Corollary 4.1 by simply replacing ®¢ with Cov(~ ®; ~ ¢). ¤
Corollary 4.6 shows that we can derive expression for the equilibrium market port-
folio, market risk premium, risk-free rate and market volatility analogous to Corollary
4.1, simply replacing ®¢ with Cov(~ ¢; ~ ®). Hence, it can be seen that results in the
two-agent economy extend to the inﬁnite-agent economy when we characterize in-
vestors’ beliefs by i.i.d random variables. In other case when ¾(~ ±) or ¾(~ ²) is positive,
it seems difﬁcult to derive analytically tractable expressions for the endogenous vari-
able in market equilibrium. Corresponding to the four cases in Table 4.1, we approxi-
mate the continuum of agents by Monte Carlo simulations with 100;000 investors and
summarize the results in Table 4.3
10.
Cases (¾¢;¾±;¾";¾®) ¼m;2 ¾(~ rm) E(~ rm ¡ rf) rf
E(~ rm)¡rf
¾m
Benchmark (0;0;0;0) 0:038 8:63% 1:49% 4:62% 0:1727
Case 1 (0:2;0;0;0:1) 0:2108 11:99% 2:45% 4:18% 0:2044
Case 2 (0;0:2;0;0:1) 0:8737 27:03% 4:17% 4:45% 0:1543
Case 3 (0;0;0:2;0:1) 0:5297 19:04% 5:50% 2:09% 0:2889
Case 4 (0:2;0:2;0;0) 0:1446 10:63% 1:85% 4:58% 0:1744
TABLE 4.3. Effects of heterogeneity on the market proportion of asset
2 (¼m;2), market volatility (¾(~ rm)), market risk-premium (E(~ rm ¡rf)),
the risk-free rate (rf) and the Sharpe ratio (E(~ rm)¡rf)=¾m for the four
cases, compared with the benchmark homogeneous case.
We can see that the results are fairly similar to that of Table 4.1. The increase
in market risk premium and reduction in the risk-free rate is most signiﬁcant when
beliefsinexpectedfutureassetreturnsispositivelycorrelationwithbeliefsinthereturn
correlation, see Tab. 4.3 case 3. In this case, the Sharpe Ratio is also the highest. Based
on this observation, we could argue that the model with two agents, which is simple to
analyze, can provide useful insight into the model with continuum of agents.
5. CONCLUSION
Heterogeneity, reﬂecting diversity and disagreement among agents, is very common
in ﬁnancial markets and it has signiﬁcant impact on the market. In this paper, we have
10In calculation, we take (¹1;¹2) = (1:06;1:09), (¾1;¾2) = (0:08;0:3) and correlation coefﬁcient ½ =
0:8. Also we assume that ~ ±e
i:i:d » N(0;¾2(~ ±)) is truncated between ¡1 and 1 and ~ ²e
i:i:d » N(0;¾2(~ ²)) is
truncated between ¡0:25 and 0:25. In addition, to compare with the results in Table 4.1 for two agents,
we assume the beliefs in expected future asset returns are positively correlated with both risk tolerance
and beliefs in return correlation with ½(~ ¢; ~ ®) = 0:9 and ½(~ ²; ~ ®) = 0:9 and negatively correlated with
beliefs in the volatility of asset returns with ½(~ ±; ~ ®) = ¡0:9. Furthermore the beliefs in the volatility is
negatively correlated risk tolerance with ½(~ ¢; ~ ±) = ¡0:9.24 HE AND SHI
examined the impact of heterogeneity among investor in a market with two risky as-
sets on the market equilibrium, in particular, the market risk premium, risk-free rate,
market volatility and the Sharpe Ratio of the market portfolio. Within a mean-variance
setting, investors’ heterogeneity is represented by their different risk tolerance, beliefs
about the expected and variance of future asset returns and the return correlation be-
tween two risky assets. Furthermore, we assume that they agree on the expected and
variance of future return for one asset, but not the other. We show that, when investors
are on average unbiased with respect to the homogeneous benchmark belief character-
izing by mean-preserving spreads of the homogenous belief, the belief of the market
equilibrium, represent by the consensus belief, is in general biased with respect to the
benchmark belief. We show that the impact of heterogeneity on the market with two
risky assets is very different from that with one risky asset. For the market with only
one risky asset, a negative correlation between risk tolerance and beliefs in expected
returns, that is the more risk tolerant investor is less optimistic about future returns,
makes the aggregate market less optimistic about the risky asset and increases the
market risk premium while reducing the risk-free rate. On the contrary, for the market
with two risky assets, we found an increase in the risk premium and a reduction in
the risk-free rate when the investor who is more optimistic about future asset returns
is more risk tolerant or more conﬁdent about future asset returns. More interestingly,
we found that this effect becomes even stronger when the more optimistic agent also
perceives a high correlation between asset returns. Therefore, we can conclude that the
impact of heterogeneity on the market equilibrium is very different when there is more
than one risky asset in the market. In general, depending on whether the heterogeneity
is greater for the more risky asset or the less risky asset, its impact on the market can
be different. We have also extended our model to a case with a continuum of investors
by using i.i.d random variables to characterize heterogeneous risk tolerance and beliefs
of investors. The analytical and numerical results obtained are very much in line with
those in the two-agent case.
The biased beliefs may depend on the market conditions. Intuitively, there may be
more disagreement among agents on the risky stocks when markets are moving down-
wards. The empirical implications of the results obtained in this paper, in particular
when the biased beliefs become part of the systematic risk in the CAPM, would be of
very interesting (such as in Anderson et al. (2005)). The disagreement in this paper is
characterized by mean-preserving spreads about a benchmark homogeneous belief. It
would also be interesting to extend the analysis to situations with skewed distribution
about the heterogeneous beliefs such as in Abel (2002). In addition, extension to a
dynamical model to examine the proﬁtability and survivability of agents with different
beliefs and the impact on the market equilibrium and trading volume in long-run (suchDIFFERENCES IN OPINION AND RISK PREMIUM 25
as in Kogan et al. (2006) and Hong and Stein (2007)) would also be interesting. We
leave these to future research.
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